Japan's population shrinks for the 13th straight year — what it looks like in practice

The numbers: 13 years of shrinkage

Japan's population peaked at approximately 128 million in 2008. The Statistics Bureau of Japan recorded the total at roughly 124 million by 2024 — a loss of 4 million people over 16 years. The decline has accelerated: in 2023, deaths exceeded births by over 850,000 people, equivalent to erasing a mid-sized city every year. The UN WPP 2024 projects Japan's population will fall below 100 million around 2060 and could reach 87 million by 2100 under medium-variant assumptions.

The age structure now shows approximately 29% of the population aged 65 or older — the highest share ever recorded for any major country. The median age is 49, compared to a global median of 31. This is the world's most extreme case of the phenomenon analysed in our piece on global ageing trends.

What contraction looks like on the ground

Japan is the world's clearest preview of what demographic contraction means in practice, not just in projections. The effects are visible across the country's geography and institutions.

Empty schools. Japan's Ministry of Education reported that roughly 500 elementary schools are consolidated or closed every year. Some rural prefectures have seen student populations halve in 20 years. Universities in rural areas face existential enrolment crises. The closure of a school is often the signal that a community has crossed into demographic irreversibility — young families will not move to a town without a school.

Akiya: the abandoned-home epidemic. Japan has over 8 million abandoned homes (akiya), a figure that rises every census. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism estimates that by 2033, one in three homes in Japan could be vacant. Some municipalities now offer abandoned homes for free or near-free to attract young families — a demographic intervention built from desperation.

Healthcare under strain. Japan's universal healthcare system is under increasing pressure: a shrinking pool of working-age contributors must finance the care of a growing elderly population. The old-age dependency ratio — people 65+ per 100 working-age adults — will exceed 70 by 2050 according to OECD projections, up from 52 today.

Immigration: necessary but contested

Japan has begun to slowly open to immigration. The government introduced a "specified skilled worker" (tokutei ginou) visa in 2019 covering 14 sectors, and has expanded its technical intern programme. Net migration turned positive by 2022, with approximately 150,000–200,000 net arrivals annually. The Ministry of Justice immigration data shows the foreign resident population surpassed 3 million for the first time in 2023.

However, this is far below the 400,000–500,000 annual net migrants that modelling suggests would be needed to stabilise Japan's population — the replacement migration threshold. Public opinion is divided. Cultural norms around ethnic homogeneity remain influential in policy debates, though younger generations show more openness. Japan remains a case study for whether demographic decline can be managed without the immigration levels that have stabilised other ageing nations.

Lessons for the world

Japan is approximately 20–30 years ahead of where South Korea, China, and Southern Europe will be demographically. The patterns visible in Japan today — school closures, rural depopulation, pension strain, labour shortages in care and construction — are what awaits countries currently entering deep sub-replacement fertility. South Korea's TFR of 0.72 (see our piece on the South Korea fertility crisis) means it will face an even more severe version of Japan's situation within a generation. China's trajectory post-one-child policy (see China's demographic legacy) is also converging toward the same endpoint.